The Government's Green Paper

�THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN� First Reactions by the Organising Committee of the Better Government Initiative to the Green Paper (CM 7170) presented to Parliament by the Rt. Hon. Jack Straw, M.P., P.C., Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor, July 2007. The Green Paper, published so early in the new administration, is warmly welcomed by the Organising Committee of the Better Government Initiative (BGI). The approach it recommends for improving Governance is in many respects what we have been arguing for in our reports and at our conferences. The BGI looks forward to participating in the proposed �national conversation� the Government intends will be prompted by it. Our own intention is that its implications, implementation and merits will be discussed at a conference the BGI is holding in October this year. Meanwhile here is a first reaction from our Organising Committee speaking for itself, but in the light of the four reports BGI working groups have already produced on: Parliament and the Executive The Centre of Government Secretaries of State and Departments Service Delivery: The NHS and Local Government which are available on our website at www.bettergovernmentinitiative.co.uk . The BGI Organising Committee believes that those reports can contribute to fulfilling the Government's intention: � �to help renew trust and confidence in our democratic institutions�; and � �to rebalance power between Parliament and Government and give Parliament more ability to hold the Government to account�. This note therefore highlights some of the BGI's proposals most relevant to these admirable goals. Other BGI proposals deal with detailed processes within Government: between the Centre of Government and Departments and within Departments; and the processes between Parliament and the Executive, particularly in the field of scrutiny, which do not feature in the Green Paper. They nevertheless concern essential means of arriving at the ends set out in that document, and are briefly mentioned below. Parliament and Executive The Green Paper includes major proposals to limit the powers of the executive, particularly in an international or domestic political crisis, by requiring the consent of Parliament to decisions about: deploying armed forces abroad, ratifying treaties, dissolving Parliament and recalling the Commons. The Government will in future inform Parliament, in advance of the Queen's Speech, of its proposed legislative programme for the forthcoming year; seek views and hold a debate on it; and �consider the most appropriate use of parliamentary time�. It will also ask the Modernisation Committee to consider how the Commons can be guaranteed �an opportunity to debate, on the floor of the House, the annual objectives and plans of the major Government Departments�. These will be valuable changes. But in our view a necessary condition for restoring confidence in our institutions is improving the quality of the output of their regular work and hence increasing the benefits for citizens. We described the problem in our report on �Parliament and the Executive�: ��despite some successes in policy and performance, the combined output of the Executive and Parliament contains too many disappointments and failures: policies that are not practicable or do not achieve their aims, legislation that is not operationally necessary, and projects�that go��.� wrong.� We have argued that tackling this demanding problem calls for wide-ranging and complementary changes both in the Executive and Parliament. Among them are: � Reducing the volume of legislation; � Making sure that all legislative and policy proposals are of higher quality, so that they meet standards of thorough preparation which Parliament should set out in resolutions; � Providing timely and full explanation by the Executive before Parliament is asked to consider legislative or policy proposals. Similarly there should in all significant instances be parliamentary papers to explain future reorganisation of government responsibilities, or those of major public services, or of changes in the guidelines addressed to them; � Strengthening scrutiny by Select Committees, as well as subsequently on the floor of the House, by changes in their selection, powers and staff support. Committees would check that legislation is operationally necessary and that the intended results have been specified clearly enough to be used as criteria in post-implementation assessment. More generally Committees would look at legislative and policy proposals to see whether the standards of thorough preparation had been met. No doubt they would also prepare reports to inform the annual debates on the floor of the House, which are now proposed, about the objectives and plans of major departments; � Correcting the fact that by international standards, and by comparison with Scotland , Parliament's financial scrutiny and influence are weak. Our report proposed changes to remedy that, both on spending and on tax; � Replace the �usual channels�. by a Commons Business Committee. It would agree the parliamentary timetable, allow time for the Government's legislative programme to be properly scrutinised, and in so doing increase transparency and inclusiveness. The BGI believes that these changes complement the proposals in the Green Paper by improving the chances that the regular joint output of Parliament and the Executive will benefit citizens: an essential part of renewing their confidence and trust in these institutions. We therefore believe that it would be useful for the Modernisation Committee and/or the Liaison Committee to consider these and other ideas set out in its reports at the same time as they consider the Green Paper. The Centre of Government The BGI has also examined aspects of the internal operation of government. Although these do not have the same constitutional resonance as issues that directly affect the relationship between the executive, Parliament and the citizen, the public�s confidence will be eroded if it appears that decisions can be taken by small, perhaps competing, groups without adequate consultation and co-ordination.. BGI recommendations in this area include: � Re-asserting the requirement that issues that engage the collective responsibility of Ministers should be considered in good time and in properly prepared form by Cabinet and its Committees, and the decisions fully recorded as a basis for future accountability; � Changing the arrangements at the Centre to bring together the separate units that have grown up there within a unified structure under the authority of the Secretary of the Cabinet; � Shifting the balance of responsibility for policy development and implementation to reduce the level of detailed control exercised by the Centre and give greater authority to Government Departments; � Establishing a powerful National Security Unit within the Cabinet Office to provide co-ordinated advice to Ministers collectively. National Security We welcome the proposal to set up a new Committee on National Security, under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister, to coordinate and oversee the Government's national security policy and its wider international, European, and international development policies. The need to expand the remit and membership of the Ministerial Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) to provide such an authoritative body, strongly chaired and supported by specialist staff within the Cabinet Office, was mentioned in our report on the Centre of Government. We understand that the terms of reference of the new body, and its structure and staffing, are now under active discussion within government. We believe it necessary that, in line with the general thrust of our own proposals, the new mechanisms should complement and reinforce, rather than replace, the existing mechanisms and responsibilities for handling the elaboration and execution of policy on defence, security, counter-terrorism and European policy. Some of these mechanisms have recently been overhauled, and all of them deal with issues at a level of everyday detail which could hardly be managed on a day-to-day basis by the new body whose focus will presumably be concentrated at the strategic level. We assume that the Joint Intelligence Committee will remain rigidly separate from the policy making process, even if its chair attends (as he/she probably should) meetings of the new Committee. The creation of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament in 1994 was a major and rather successful step forward towards making the security intelligence agencies accountable. The fact that its chair was appointed by the Prime Minister, to whom it reported, and that it met in secret, inevitably gave rise to suspicions at the time that it would not be transparent, and that its conclusions would be jejune or biased towards the government. Its record has been better than that. We welcome the proposals to increase transparency and to bring appointments to the Committee more into line with the procedures for other Select Committees, subject of course to the provisos that its ability to see secret papers and to produce non-partisan conclusions are not undermined. The proposal to appoint an independent investigator and to set up a separate staff will help to ensure that, on the obvious assumption that their security clearances and place of work enable them to continue seeing documents of the highest classification. Ministers and Officials The Green Paper outlines a number of changes to the Ministerial Code, mainly concerned with matters of propriety and openness. We welcome these, but have argued that the Code would also be an appropriate medium for stating the personal responsibilities of Ministers for ensuring timely collective discussion of issues of weight; for adherence to collective decisions; and, working with their Departments, to ensure the quality of policy development and the preparation of legislation. The Organising Committee also welcomes the intention of bringing forward early legislation to enshrine the core values of the , Civil Service, while maintaining its ability to adapt to changed circumstances, and to improve the definition of the role of Special Advisers. We believe that there is further work to be done in parallel with this legislation clarifying the respective roles of Ministers and civil servants. Local Government We take the view that local government - through the election of councilors - is a bedrock of democracy. It is important that the standing and authority of local government councillors and leaders are safeguarded and enhanced. It follows that proposals for the appointment of Regional Ministers and their accountability to Parliamentary Select Committees should not undermine the responsibility and standing of local authority leaders. We hope that this consideration will be borne in mind in developing the way in which Regional Ministers work and report to Parliament. It is a crucial function of local authority councillors to represent and support the interests of the locality which they represent. While we welcome the opening of opportunities for individuals to influence the actions of their authority, the primary method of doing this should be through the local councillor. If his or her authority is lessened, the democratic process suffers. It equally suffers if a decision by an elected body, such as a local authority, after it has taken account of very different interests and views, is made difficult to implement. We hope these considerations will be taken into account in developing these proposals. Finally, we are glad to see the proposal for a local/central government concordat. We hope this can establish a stable financial and administrative basis for cooperation between the two sides. It is, of course, already the responsibility of local government to provide effective leadership, and we hope the concordat will make this easier. Related Issues Most important of the other issues of concern to the BGI - understandably beyond the scope of the present Green Paper but bearing on its aims - are those concerning the relationship between the Centre and Departments. The Group�s reports conclude that there is evidence that the balance of influence has in recent times moved too far towards the Centre, with inevitable consequences for the capacity and will of Departments, and needs to be readjusted. At the same time, attention must be paid to maintaining the human capital of Departments through training, succession planning, restoring expert professional support where it has been run down, and keeping a proper balance between management, analysis and advice as the core functions of Departments. 16th July 2007

[ Back ]